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INsURANCE-INsURER's RIGHT OF R.EsTITUTION FOR (I) ExcEs-
SIVE PAYMENT MADE IN DISCHARGE OF THE LIABILITY OF A Co-
INSURER AND (2) CosTs OF DEFENSE-The increasing use of the "pro 
rata" or "other insurance" clause in liability insurance policies has 
given rise to new instances of coinsurer relationships. Such a clause 
typically provides that the insurer will not be liable under its policy 
for a greater proportion of any loss than the applicable limit of liability 
of its policy bears to the total applicable limit of all valid and collectible 
insurance against such loss.1 It has been frequently stated that the 
existence of such clauses in two policies covering the same loss renders 
the liability under each of the policies several and not joint, and accord-
ingly that neither insurer has any right of contribution from the other.2 
It is the purpose of this comment to consider whether this rule is 
properly applicable in all cases involving a coinsurer relationship.3 
Crystallization of the rule can be traced to its use in cases involving 
a voluntary settlement made out of court between the insured and one 
of the insurers. The question of the legal effect that such a settlement 
has on the nonparticipating insurer has usually been raised in one of 
two ways. Either the insurer who is a stranger to the agreement 
attempts to utilize the settlement as a defense in an action brought by 
the insured for the defendant company's pro rata share of the total 
loss,4 or the payor insurance company attempts to use the settlement 
as the basis for an action against the other insurer for a proportionate 
share of the settlement amount.5 In these situations the courts have 
uniformly held that an agreement between the insured and one of the 
insurers is only determinative of the rights and liabilities of these two 
l The purpose of the clause is to protect the insurer against over-insurance. Smith, 
''The Proratio Clause," 1949 lNs. L.J. 83 at 84. Cf. 58 YALE L.J. 307 (1949). 
2 21 A.L.R. (2d) 611 at 613 (1952); 46 C.J.S., Insurance §1208 (1946); 29 AM.. 
Jun., Insurance §1333 (1940). 
3 Discussion of the numerous rules for apportioning the loss among the coinsurers is 
beyond the scope of this comment. On this aspect of the coinsurer relationship see 40 
HARv. L. REv. 878 (1927); 10 W1s. L. REv. 114 (1934); 58 YALE L.J. 307 (1949); and 
Ehrenzweig and Ehrenzweig, "Apportionment of Losses Between 'Blanket' and 'Specific' 
Insurance Policies," 43 Cot. L. REv. 825 (1943). 
4Lucas v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 6 Cow. (N.Y.) *635 (1827); Globe National Fire Ins. 
Co. v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 205 Iowa 1085, 217 N.W. 268 (1927); Rallis 
v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 46 N.M. 77, 120 P. (2d) 736 (1941). 
5 Southern Surety Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., (3d Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 
817, cert. den. 280 U.S. 577, 50 S.Ct. 31 (1929); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. 
Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 38 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 100 P. (2d) 364 (1940); Farm 
Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co., 147 Ohio St. 79, 
67 N.E. (2d) 906 (1946). 
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parties, and consequently the insurer who is a stranger to the agree-
ment may neither take advantage of, nor be subjected to, the terms of 
the voluntary settlement. However, the recent case of Commercial 
Standard Insurance Co. 11. American Employers Insurance Co.6 was 
concerned with the legal significance of the coinsurer relationship in 
a setting that did not involve the usual voluntary settlement. In the 
Commercial Standard case the insured was covered by a liability policy 
with a $10,000 limit issued by plaintiff insurance company, and two 
$10,000 limit policies issued by defendant company. Each of the poli-
cies contained a pro rata clause, and both companies were obligated 
to defend any suit against the insured if the loss involved was covered 
by the policies. Upon the occurrence of an accident, the defendant 
company erroneously decided that the loss did not come within the 
coverage of its policies and the plaintiff was left to defend the resulting 
lawsuit alone, expending about $3,000 in so doing. The injured party 
obtained a judgment for $5,000 which was paid in full by the plaintiff 
company. Plaintiff then brought an action against defendant company 
for two-thirds of the judgment and costs of defense incurred in the 
prior action, contending that the policies of defendant covered the loss. 
Thus, rather than the case of a payment made pursuant to a voluntary 
settlement, the Commercial Standard case presented the situation where 
one insurance company wrongfully disclaims coverage and the other 
insurer, acknowledging coverage by its policy, proceeds to defend the 
insured against suit and discharges the entire amount of the resulting 
judgment which is determinative of the insured' s total loss. But the 
court, though agreeing with the plaintiff that the loss involved in the 
prior litigation was in fact covered by the policies of the defendant, 
was unwilling to recognize any significant distinction between the two 
situations. Relying on authority that developed out of the voluntary 
settlement cases, the court dismissed the action on the ground that 
here too the payor company is liable only for its proportion of the 
judgment, and when it pays more it is a mere volunteer. 
Little, if any, disagreement can be found with the starting point of 
the court's decision, i.e., that the plaintiff company was liable only for 
its proportionate part of the judgment. However, whether the court 
was justified in concluding that therefore the plaintiff was a volunteer 
to the extent that its payment exceeded its liability is a matter that is 
subject to some question. There are several decisions that tend to 
6 (D.C. Ky. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 176. 
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support the court's conclusion.7 However, it is believed that a recent 
Wisconsin case8 is the only other case that actually involves the Com-
mercial Standard situation, and the Wisconsin court held that the payor 
company should recover the defendant company's share of the dis-
charged judgment. The necessary implication of the Wisconsin 
decision would seem to be that in this situation the payor is something 
more than a volunteer when it makes a payment in excess of the amount 
of its own liability. The Commercial Standard decision and the Wis-
consin decision offer different answers to the question of the voluntary 
character of such a payment, with neither decision presenting any 
substantial analysis in support of its conclusion. 
It is submitted that the compelling reason behind the conclusion 
that the payor company is a mere volunteer when it makes an allegedly 
excessive payment pursuant to a voluntary settlement with the insured 
is to be found in the unwillingness of a court to bind the nonpartici-
pating insurer to the terms of an agreement in which it has taken no 
part.9 It is clear that this insurer should be given its chance to dispute 
the existence of any liability on its part and/ or the amount of its 
liability.10 Thus, the case appears to be one that rather dearly calls 
for the application of the volunteer rule. In terms of this analysis, the 
Standard Commercial situation offers quite a different case. If it 
should be decided that defendant's policy does cover the loss, the de-
fendant, having refused to defend the action brought against the 
insured, is bound by the resulting determinations concerning the exist-
ence and amount of liability on the part of the insured. The question 
whether defendant's policy covers the loss is fully litigated in the action 
brought by the payor company against the defendant. While in the 
voluntary settlement case there is merely an allegation that an excessive 
payment has been made, in the Commercial Standard situation it is 
judicially established that there has in fact been an excessive payment 
of fixed amount. 
1 American Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., (D.C. Pa. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 
561; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Hicks Rubber Co., 140 Tex. 586, 169 S.W. (2d) 142 
(1943); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Palatine Ins. Co., 150 Cal. 252, 88 P. 907 (1907). 
s United States Guarantee Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 244 Wis. 317, 12 N.W. 
(2d) 59 (1943). [The Supreme Court of Michigan reached the same result in Detroit 
Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Detroit Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., (Mich. 1953) 59 N.W. 
(2d) 80, decided after this comment was written.-Ed.] 
9 See Lucas v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 6 Cow. (N.Y.) *635 at 638, 639 (1827); Globe 
National Fire Ins. Co. v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 205 Iowa 1085 at 1092, 217 
N.W. 268 (1927). 
10 Southern Surety Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., (3d Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 
817 at 819, cert. den. 280 U.S. 577, 50 S.Ct. 31 (1929). 
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Once it has been determined that defendant's policy covers the loss, 
the defendant is no longer able to dispute the fact that it was liable 
for its proportionate part of the judgment, and the crucial issue is 
whether plaintiff should be subrogated to the rights of the insured. On 
this point, the defense against plaintiff's action for restitution of the 
excessive payment is grounded on the argument that despite the exist-
ence of defendant's liability the plaintiff's unsolicited discharge of the 
liability of another automatically renders the payment subject to the 
officious volunteer rule and thereby precludes its recovery. · That the 
unsolicited discharge of another's obligations without more is subject 
to the volunteer rule is well established.11 Thus, the payor must justify 
the excessive payment on some judicially recognized basis if it is to 
escape classification as a volunteer, and in this respect its case appears 
to be one of a borderline nature. Since the payor faced a serious threat 
of a lawsuit by the insured if it had chosen to discharge only its pro-
portionate part of the judgment, the cases permitting restitution on 
the basis of duress through civil litigation seem to offer the most closely 
analogous ground on which the payor can justify the course of action 
which it has pursued. But the threat of a lawsuit without more can 
hardly be said to constitute duress, since it is merely a threat to do 
what there is a legal right to do.12 Therefore, successful use of the 
threat of civil litigation as a basis for the recovery of excessive payment 
is dependent upon a showing of a fear of some kind of punitive loss 
resulting from the use of legal process.13 Recovery of excessive pay-
ment has been allowed where the threatened litigation would have 
injured the payor's credit position,14 or impaired the present market-
ability of his property.15 In all likelihood the threatened litigation 
involved in the Commercial Standard case would have caused some 
injury to the reputation and goodwill of the payor.16 While the injury 
thus threatened is not as tangible and certain as that involved in the 
11 See 36 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1923); 40 MicH. L. REv. 1240 (1942). 
12 Dawson, "Duress Through Civil Litigation," 45 MicH, L. RBv. 571 at 579 (1947). 
For a suggested limitation as to the area in which this proposition is properly applicable see 
Dawson, "Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective," 45 MrcH. L. REv. 253 at 287 
(1947). 
13 47 HARv. L. REv. 1413 at 1418 (1934). 
14 Chandler v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364 (1874); Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 
N.W. 217 (1892). 
15 First Nat. Bank of David City v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N.W. 595 (1902); 
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Erwin, 44 Okla. 768, 145 P. 1125 (1914). 
16 Dawson, "Duress Through Civil Litigation," 45 MicH. L. REv. 571 at 582 (1947). 
Also see note 18 infra. 
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more typical cases of duress through threat of civil litigation, it may 
well be urged that the situation in the Commercial Standard case is 
deserving of a slightly relaxed rule in this respect. Some of the 
reluctance to allow relief on the grounds of duress can probably be 
attributed to the judicial dislike of permitting the payor to use legal 
pro~ess to recover an excessive payment from one to whom the payor 
has just made the payment.17 In the Commercial Standard case the 
payor is not seeking recovery from the very same party to whom the 
excessive payment was made. There appears to be no compelling 
policy reason for applying the officious volunteer rule so as to reward 
the insured who wrongfully disclaimed liability at the expense of the 
payor company which, while exceedingly adventuresome in its choice 
of a course of action, was willing to relieve the insured from the entire 
expense and trouble of the loss, as was contemplated by the policies of 
both insurers.18 Consequently, it would seem justifiable to utilize 
the rationale of the duress through threat of civil litigation cases in 
order to permit recovery by the payor insurance company. 
Regardless of the course of action pursued with respect to the dis-
charge of the judgment, the insurer that acknowledges coverage by its 
policy is forced to undertake the entire expense of defending the action 
brought against the insured. In the Commercial Standard case this 
expense amounted to $3,000. In dismissing the action, the court 
made no reference to this aspect of plaintiff's claim, apparently feeling 
that it in no way differed from the claim for a proportionate part of the 
judgment.19 While the decision in the Commercial Standard case with 
respect to the claim for defendant's pro rata share of the discharged 
judgment may be supported on the basis of a strict application of the 
volunteer concept, it would seem that the plaintiff should nevertheless 
have been allowed to recover defendant's proportionate share of the 
17 See Dawson, ''Duress Through Civil Litigation," 45 Mi:cH. L. REv. 571 at 573 
(1947); 47 HARv. L. REv. 1413 at 1415 (1934). 
18 "The insurance company is not a mere buyer of claims. It pays in the protection of 
legitimate interests, and by this token should fall within the class of involuntary payors. By 
paying it avoids litigation, and by not disputing a claim, protects its good will in the 
business community. Of the two, moreover, the wrongdoer in equity and good conscience 
should pay. All the necessary elements for the application of the doctrine of subrogation 
are present. It seems, furthermore, unjust to deny a recovery where the defendant has so 
obviously received a benefit, and where granting the relief places no additional burden 
upon him." 36 HARv. L. REv. 330 at 333 (1923). 
10 Only one other case could be found in which this specific question was raised, and 
there too the plaintiff's claim was dismissed without adequate consideration of the circum-
stances under which plaintiff was forced to make the disbursements. Traders & General 
Ins. C-0. v. Hicks Rubber Co., 140 Tex. 586 at 597, 598, 169 S.W. (2d) 142 (1943). 
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costs of defense. Even though the applicability of the pro rata clauses 
is extended to the defense provisions in the respective policies so that 
the obligation of each insurer to defend is somehow deemed to be 
several, and not joint, the obvious self-interest which the payor has in 
the outcome of the litigation provides a sound basis for justifying the 
discharge of the entire obligation by the payor.20 Several closely 
analogous cases can be cited where the self-interest of the payor has 
been deemed to justify an unsolicited payment. Discharge of a senior 
mortgage by the junior mortgagee,21 or discharge by the life tenant of 
a mortgage which covers both the life estate and the remainder,22 are 
but two of the more common instances in which the self-interest of the 
payor provides the basis for subrogating him to the rights of his payee.23 
Thus, as a matter .of legal principle, it is difficult to see how the dis-
bursements made in defense of the action against the insured can 
properly be classified as mere voluntary payments. In addition, the 
result reached in the Commercial Standard case may well constitute a 
tempting invitation to an insurer to abstain from fulfilling its con-
tractual obligations. 
John W. Hupp, S.Ed. 
20 Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoBN. L.Q. 205 at 239 (1930). 
212 JoNES, MORTGAGES 572 (1928). 
22Bartels v. Seefus, 132 Neb. 841, 273 N.W. 485 (1937); Snow v. Arnold, 132 Fla. 
435, 181 s. 7 (1938). 
23 Other cases involving the self-interest justilication include the discharge of tax liens 
by mortgagees, De Haven v. Roscon Building & Loan Assn., 107 Pa. Super. 459, 164 A. 
69 (1933), and cases collected in 61 A.L.R. 587 at 601 (1929) and 106 A.L.R. 1212 at 
1217 (1937); and the discharge by a wife of liens on her husband's property, Elmora & 
West End Building & Loan Assn. v. Dancy, 108 N.J. Eq. 542, 155 A. 796 (1931); Moody 
v. Isselstein, 106 Wash. 294, 179 P. 855 (1919). 
